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INTRODUCTION 
There cannot be any doubt that the rule of law is one of the 
most elementary and important features of the European Union 
and the process of European integration as a whole. Without 
denying the nature of the integration as a genuinely political 
process, it is quite obvious that the rule of law is a truly 
fundamental factor for the supranational European Union 
which appears in legal texts as in legal practice as a true 
cornerstone of the entire construction. The most prominent 
placing of the rule of law in article 2 of the Treaty on European 
Union (“TEU”) amongst the values, on which the European 
Union is founded, might constitute the formal basis of the truly 
essential nature of the rule of law for the establishment of the 
European Union. The well-known reports of the Commission on 
the rule of law in accession countries might be another symbolic 
element of general political visibility in this respect.1 
The particular significance of the rule of law for the 
European Union is explained, better than in any source of legal 
or judicial nature, in the speech that Walter Hallstein gave in 
March 1962 at the University of Padua on the European 
Economic Community as a Community of law, in which he 
stated:  
This Community was not created by military power or 
political pressure, but owes its existence to a constitutive 
legal act. It also lives in accordance with fixed rules of law 
and its institutions are subject to judicial review. In place of 
power and its manipulation, the balance of powers, the 
                                                                                                             
1. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication From the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Enlargement Strategy 
and Main Challenges 2013–2014, COM(2013) 700 Final (Oct. 2013), 6–8; see also, e.g., 
Commission of the European Communities, Communication From the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council on Albania 2013 Progress Report, 
SWD(2013) 414 Final, 5–10; Commission of the European Communities, 
Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on Serbia 2013 Progress Report, SWD(2013) 412 Final, 6–10; Commission of the 
European Communities, Communication From the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on Turkey 2013 Progress Report, SWD(2013) 417 Final, 5–
13. 
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striving for hegemony and the play of alliances we have for 
the first time the rule of law. The European Economic 
Community is a community of law . . . , because it serves to 
realize the idea of law.2  
On the basis of this historical perspective, he reached the 
conclusion which until today appears to be a most exquisite 
portrayal of the nature of the treaties:  
The founding treaty, which may not be terminated, forms a 
kind of a Constitution for the Community which contains 
rules on the establishment, composition, tasks, competences 
and interaction of the institutions of the Community as well 
as their relations with the Member States and the 
Community citizens . . . . But Community law not only 
grants powers to the Commission and the Council; at the 
same time, it provides for the restriction and limitation of 
these powers. The observance of these limits is ensured by 
the judicial review, which is entrusted to the European 
Court of Justice. The Court reviews the legality of acts of the 
Council and the Commission and provides legal protection 
in the field of Community law not only for Member States 
but also for Community citizens.3 
But, as it is the case with other fundamental constitutional 
principles which have soon found general recognition, the real 
challenge with which the rule of law is confronted in practice is 
not a lack of acceptance or a sentiment of hidden regret. It is 
rather the seemingly self-evident respect of the rule of law in 
western democracies, which goes somehow strangely along with 
the feeling that one does not need to be engaged for a legal 
principle which is as obvious as the rule of law and therefore 
does not require our principal attentiveness. Of course, nothing 
is more profoundly wrong and dangerous than this kind of 
reasoning, which is in full contrast with the general experience 
which the judiciary has made throughout the western world. 
Whether you take the practice of the US Supreme Court or of 
the German Constitutional Court on the national level or of the 
European Court of Human Rights or of the European Court of 
                                                                                                             
2. See WALTER HALLSTEIN, Die EWG—Eine Rechtsgemeinschaft. Rede anlässlich der 
Ehrenpromotion (Universität Padua, 12. März 1962), in EUROPÄISCHE REDEN 341, 343–44 
(1979) (translation provided by author).  
3. Id. at 344. 
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Justice (“ECJ”) on the supranational level, the experience is 
essentially identical in the sense that the democratic process 
does not offer sufficient and sufficiently effective guarantees 
against an abuse of power. If the king was said to do no wrong, 
governments and legislators in democratic systems certainly can 
do wrong and, based upon our experience, will do so. This is 
why it is and will remain a continued task of the judiciary to 
ensure the respect of the rule of law. In the European Union, 
this is in principle no different than in its Member States, but it 
is of course subject to a significant number of specific 
considerations in the respective contexts in which the scrutiny of 
the ECJ intervenes. 
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ 
ON THE RULE OF LAW 
Though it took the ECJ until 1986 to formally adhere to the 
words of Walter Hallstein that the European Union is by its 
nature a community of law,4 the oeuvre of the Court is, since the 
very beginnings, closely linked to the development of principles 
which form an integral part of the rule of law as it is recognized 
throughout the national legal orders of its Member States. 
A. Foundations in the Early Jurisprudence of the Court 
Despite the specific European context, in which the rule of 
law is placed hereby explaining the particular importance of the 
other values proclaimed in article 2 TEU, such as human 
dignity, freedom, and equality, as well as non-discrimination and 
human rights in general, the Court’s jurisprudence on elements 
of the rule of law originated from a rather traditional 
perspective concerning the principles of legality, legal certainty, 
confidence in the stability of a legal situation, and 
proportionality.5 
                                                                                                             
4. See Les Verts v. Parliament, Case C-294/83, [1986] E.C.R. I-1357, ¶ 23. 
5. The leading cases of the early jurisprudence of the Court in this field have 
been, Algera and others v. Common Assembly, Joined Cases 7/56 & 3–7/57, [1957] 
E.C.R.  41, 55 (stating the principle of legality and principle of legal certainty); 
S.N.U.P.A.T. v. High Auth., Joined Cases C-42/59 & 49/59, [1961] E.C.R. 55, 87 
(stating the principle of legal certainty); Alvis v. Council, Case C-32/62, [1963] E.C.R. 
49, 55 (stating the right to be heard); Klomp v. Inspectie der Belastingen, Case C-
23/68, [1969] E.C.R. 44, ¶ 13 (stating the confidence in the stability of a legal 
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As it already became apparent in the equally famous and 
fundamental Algera judgment, in which a comparative study had 
shown that the principle of non-revocability of administrative 
measures giving rise to individual rights is a legal principle 
generally acknowledged in the legal orders of all Member States, 
it would amount to a denial of justice, if the Court would have 
based its judgment on the absence of an explicit rule in the 
secondary law of the Union without having recourse to the 
general principles of Union law as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.6 But, 
since the specific conditions for the application of such general 
principles vary from one national legal order to another, the 
recognition of general principles of Union law derived from the 
common constitutional traditions always entails a creative 
element and produces a harmonizing effect which goes beyond 
the democratic legitimacy offered by the secondary legislation of 
the Union.7 Being a paramount example of judge made law in 
the European Union, the evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence 
in this field is characterized by a cautious step-by-step approach 
and a particular self-restraint.8 Nonetheless, over the past fifty-
seven years since the Algera judgment, the Court has recognized 
a wide range of principles which form an integral part of the 
rule of law. The most prominent examples are substantive rules 
derived from the principle of legality,9 the principle of legal 
                                                                                                             
situation); Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide 
und Futtermittel, Case C-11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1126, ¶ 12 (proportionality); H. 
Ferwerda v. Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees, Case C-265/78, [1980] E.C.R. 618, ¶ 17 
(stating the principle of legal certainty); Merkur Fleisch-Import v. Hauptzollamt 
Hamburg-Ericus, Case C-147/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1389, ¶ 12 (stating proportionality); 
Denkavit Nederland v. Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten, Case C-15/83, 
[1984] E.C.R. 2172, ¶ 25 (stating proportionality). 
6. See Algera and others, [1957] E.C.R. 41, 55. 
7. See THOMAS VON DANWITZ, EUROPÄISCHES VERWALTUNGSRECHT, ENZYKLOPÄDIE 
DER RECHTS—UND STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 210–14 (2008). 
8. For cases regarding to the confidentiality of written communications between 
lawyers and clients, see, for example, AM & S v. Commission, Case C-155/79, [1982] 
E.C.R. 1577, ¶¶ 18–21; Akzo Nobel Chems. and Akcros Chems. v. Commission, Case C-
550/07 P, [2010] E.C.R. I-8301, ¶¶ 40–43, 69–70. 
9. See Algera and others,, [1957] E.C.R. 41, 55; S.N.U.P.A.T.,, [1961] E.C.R. 55, 86; 
De Compte v. Parliament, Case C-90/95 P, [1997] E.C.R. I-2011, ¶ 35; Conserve Italia v. 
Commission, Case C-500/99 P, [2002] E.C.R. I-905, ¶ 90. See also the case law relating 
to the principle of the legality of criminal offences and penalties, X, Case C-60/02, 
[2004] E.C.R. I-665, ¶ 63; Advocaten voor de Wereld v. Leden van de Ministerraad, 
Case C-303/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-3672, ¶¶ 49–50. 
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certainty,10 the principle of confidence in the stability of a legal 
situation,11 and, in particular, the principle of proportionality.12 
Furthermore, the Court has recognized a significant number of 
procedural guarantees as an embodiment of the rule of law such 
as the right to be heard13 and the right of defence,14 the right of 
access to the file,15 and the obligation to a proper motivation of 
legal acts.16 
                                                                                                             
10. See Administration des douanes v Société anonyme Gondrand Frères and 
Société anonyme Garancini (Gondrand and Garancini), Case C-169/80, [1981] E.C.R. 
1931, ¶ 15; Gebroeders van Es Douane Agenten v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en 
Accijnzen, Case C-143/93, [1996] E.C.R. I-459, ¶ 27; Belgium v. Commission, C-
110/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-2829, ¶ 30; Akzo Nobel Chems. and Akcros Chems., [2010] E.C.R. I-
8301, ¶ 100 and the case law cited therein. 
11. See Algera and others, [1957] E.C.R. 41, 55; S.N.U.P.A.T., [1961] E.C.R. 55, 87; 
Lemmerz Werke v. High Auth., Case C-111/63, [1965] E.C.R. 678, 691; Klomp, [1969] 
E.C.R. 44, ¶ 13. For the more recent case law, see, for example, Marks & Spencer, Case 
C̻62/00, [2002] E.C.R. I-6348, ¶¶ 44–45; Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde and 
Bundeskartellanwalt v Schenker & Co. AG and Others, Case C̻681/11, [2013] E.C.R. I-
0000, ¶ 41; Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation v. v 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue and Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs, Case C̻362/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 44–45. 
12.  Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide 
und Futtermittel, Case C-11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1126, ¶ 12; Merkur Fleisch-Import v. 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Ericus, Case C-147/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1389, ¶. 12; Denkavit 
Nederland v. Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten, Case C-15/83, [1984] 
E.C.R. 2172, ¶ 25; Schräder v. Hauptzollamt Gronau, Case C-265/87, [1989] E.C.R. 
2237, ¶ 2. For the more recent case law, see, for example, Afton Chemical v. Secretary 
of State for Transport, Case C̻343/09, [2010] E.C.R. I̻7027, ¶ 45; Nelson and Others 
v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG & TUI Travel plc and Others v. Civil Aviation Auth., Joined 
Cases 581/10 & 629/10, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 71; Sky Österreich v. Österreichischer 
Rundfunk, Case C̻283/11, [2013] E.C.R. I-____, ¶ 50. 
13. Alvis v Council of the EEC, Case 32/62, [1963] E.C.R. 49, 55; Commission v. 
Lisrestal and others, Case C-32/95 P, [1996] E.C.R. I-5387, ¶ 21; Mediocurso v. 
Commission, Case C-462/98 P, [2000] E.C.R. I-7196, ¶ 36; Sopropé—Organizações de 
Calçado Lda. v. Fazenda Pública, Case C-349/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-10369, ¶¶ 36–37; 
France v. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, Case C-27/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-____, ¶¶ 
65–66; G. and R v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, Case C-383/13 PPU, 
[2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 32 and the case law cited therein. 
14. See AM & S v. Commission, Case C-155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1577, ¶ 18; Orkem v. 
Commission, Case C-374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3343, ¶ 32; Akzo Nobel Chems. and Akcros 
Chems., [2010] E.C.R. I-8301, ¶ 92 and the case law cited therein. 
15. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, Case C-85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 464, ¶¶ 9, 
11; Hercules Chemicals v. Commission, Case C-51/92 P, [1999] E.C.R. I-4250, ¶ 75; 
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v. Commission, Joined Cases 238, 244, 245, 
247, 250–52, 254/99 P, [2002] E.C.R. I-8618, ¶¶ 315–16; Aalborg Portland and others 
v. Commission, Case C-204/00 P, [2004] E.C.R. I-403, ¶ 68; Knauf Gips KG v. 
Commission, Case C-407/08 P, [2010] E.C.R. I-6375, ¶ 22. 
16. See Portugal v. Commission, Case C-42/01, [2004] E.C.R. I-6102, ¶ 66; 
Unicredito Italiano v. Agenzia delle Entrate, Ufficio Genova 1, Case C-148/04, [2005] 
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B. The Increasing Importance of Comparative Considerations in Legal 
Reasoning 
Given the particular importance of the role which the 
Court has attributed to comparative considerations in the 
evolution of general principles of Union law, it appears 
regrettable from an outside perspective that the methodology 
which the Court applies is not made fully transparent.17 The 
rather short references which are contained in the Court’s 
judgments18 indeed only constitute the “tip of the iceberg”19 and 
are based on extensive considerations contained in the 
conclusions of the Advocate General20 and on preliminary 
research done by the internal service of the Court.21 This lack of 
full methodological transparency, which has somehow been 
compensated for by a particularly intense treatment of the 
                                                                                                             
E.C.R. I-11169, ¶ 99; Spain v. Council, Case C-310/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-7318, ¶ 57; 
Interporc v. Commission, Case C-41/00 P, [2003] E.C.R. I-2156, ¶ 55; Elf Aquitaine v. 
Commission, Case C-521/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 14; Confédération suisse v. 
Commission, Case C-547/10 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 67. 
17. SeePauliine Koskelo, Report of P. Koskelo, President of the Supreme Court of Finland, 
in ACTES DU COLLOQUE POUR LE CINQUANTIÈME ANNIVERSAIRE DES TRAITÉS DE ROME 24 
(2007), available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/actes-du-colloque-pour-le-
cinquanti-me-anniversaire-des-trait-s-de-rome-pbQD7707253/. 
18. See LTU v. Eurocontrol, Case C-29/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1541, ¶ 5; Kampffmeyer 
and others v. Commission and Council, Joined Cases C-56–60/74, [1976] E.C.R. 712, ¶ 
6; Hoechst v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2919, ¶ 17; 
Gerhard Köbler v. Republik Österreich, Case C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-10290, ¶ 48 
(principle of res judicata and independence of the judiciary); ThyssenKrupp Nirosta 
GmbH v. Commission, Case C-352/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-2359, ¶ 123 (principle of res 
judicata); Omega, Case C-36/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-9641, ¶¶ 33, 35 (human dignity). In 
relation to the confidentiality of written communications between lawyers and clients, 
the Court considered it appropriate to found its judgment on a more detailed analysis 
of the legal situation in the Member States, see AM & S, [1982] E.C.R. p. I-1577, ¶¶ 
18–21; Akzo Nobel Chems. and Akcros Chems., [2010] E.C.R. I-8301, ¶¶ 40–43, 69–76. 
19. See Pierre Pescatore, Le recours dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des 
Communautés Européennes a des normes déduites de la comparaison des droits des États 
membres, 35 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARÉ [R.I.D.C] 337, 358 (1980) (Fr.). 
20. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Hoechst v. Commission, Joined 
Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R. I-2875, ¶¶ 48–126; Opinion of Advocate General 
Léger, Köbler v. Austria Case C-224/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-10243, ¶¶ 91, 96; Opinion of 
Advocate General Stix-Hackl, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v 
Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, Case C-36/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-9611, ¶¶ 
82–84; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Akzo Nobel Chems. and Akcros Chems., 
[2010] E.C.R. I-8301, ¶¶ 47, 89–91, 101–04. 
21. RÜDIGER STOTZ, Die Rolle des Gerichtshofs bei der Integration, in Rengeling/von 
Borries (Hrsg.), in AKTUELLE ENTWICKLUNGEN IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 21, 
42  n.118. 
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comparative method in academic writing of different 
generations of judges of the Court,22 is certainly due to the 
discretion which the Court has to exercise in the evolution and 
recognition of general principles of Union law and in particular 
when it comes to determine the precise contours of such a 
principle. In order to protect the authority of the Court’s 
judgments, it becomes more and more vital to base judicial 
decision-making on comparative insights. Since the enlargement 
of the European Union goes along with an increase of legal 
orders which have to be taken into consideration when it comes 
to the recognition of general principles of EU law, the 
importance of comparative analysis is equally enhanced and the 
discretion which the Court has to exercise in this respect 
certainly becomes more delicate. 
But, the increasing importance of comparative 
considerations in legal reasoning in EU law is, in particular, 
intensified by an evolution which has been initiated by national 
judiciaries and is enshrined in the concept of what is called 
“multilevel cooperation of courts” or Gerichtsverbund in the 
European Union.23 On the basis of what Chief Justice Murray 
from Ireland described as a growing judicial cosmopolitanism,24 
this methodology of interpretation has expanded significantly in 
recent years. Today, judges pay increasing attention to 
comparative law arguments. While the famous controversy 
                                                                                                             
22. HANS KUTSCHER, THESEN ZU DEN METHODEN DER AUSLEGUNG DES 
GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTS AUS DER SICHT EINES RICHTERS 23 (1976)(abbreviated language 
of material); Pierre Pescatore, Le recours dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des 
Communautés Européennes a des normes déduites de la comparaison des droits des États 
membres, 35 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARÉ [R.I.D.C] 337 (1980) (Fr.); 
Josse Mertens de Wilmars, Le droit comparé dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des 
Communautées européennes, JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 37 (1991) (Fr.) (abbreviated 
language of material); Yves Calmot, Réflexions sur le recours au droit comparé par la Cour de 
justice des Communautés européennes, RÉVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 258 
(1990)(Fr.) (abbreviated language of material). 
23. See Andreas Voßkuhle, President, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Sir Thomas More 
Lecture at the Honourable Society of Lincoln’s Inn: European Integration and the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Oct. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Voßkuhle, European 
Integration], available at http://www.london.diplo.de/contentblob/4026032/Daten/
3646135/Vosskuhle.pdf. 
24. JOHN L. MURRAY, Methods of Interpretation  Comparative Law Method, in ACTES 
DU COLLOQUE POUR LE CINQUANTIEME ANNIVERSAIRE DES TRAITES DE ROME 45, 48 
(Euorpean Court of Justice eds., 2007), available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/ 
actes-du-colloque-pour-le-cinquanti-me-anniversaire-des-trait-s-de-rome-pbQD7707253/. 
2014] THE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ 1319 
between Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia from the US 
Supreme Court concerning the relevance of foreign law for the 
interpretation of the US Constitution has shown the conceptual 
difference in paradigmatic clarity,25 the interpretation rule 
enshrined in article 39 of the South African Constitution of 
1996, according to which the interpretation of fundamental 
rights has to respect international law and has to take account of 
foreign law, is certainly an instructive example of this recent 
evolution.26 But, of course, it is of much greater practical 
importance to see that the ECJ has, by way of preliminary 
references, already been confronted with differences in the 
constitutional conceptions of different Member States and, on 
that basis, been asked to take those considerations into account 
when interpreting a fundamental right granted by the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.27 
The interpretation of fundamental rights offers a 
particularly striking example for the growing need of 
comparative analysis and the search for an interpretation which 
takes account of the meaning given to an equivalent right. This 
consideration has to be highlighted in the European context of 
the protection of fundamental rights, which genuinely takes 
place in a multilayered system. On the national level, 
fundamental rights are protected by national constitutions and, 
in quite a number of states, by constitutions of federated 
entities. On the European level, fundamental rights of EU 
                                                                                                             
25. See the grounds of the judgment written by Justice Kennedy for the majority 
in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003) with reference to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. In addition, see the dissenting opinion by Scalia, in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 (1988) and in Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 608 (2005). In this regard, see also Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad when 
Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353 (2004); Richard 
A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 
85–90 (2005); William H. Pryor Jr., Foreign and International Law Sources in Domestic 
Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173 (2006); Ganesh Sitaraman, 
The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
653 (2009); Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: the U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign 
Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637 (2007); DONALD W. JACKSON, GLOBALIZING JUSTICE: 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND THE CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION 
OF LEGAL NORMS 7 (Michael C. Tolley & Mary L. Volcansek eds., 2010). 
26. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, art. 39. 
27. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. C 364/1 
[hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. See, e.g., Germany v. Y and Z, Joined 
Cases C-71/11 & C-99/11, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 42, 56–72. 
1320 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1311 
citizens are protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, by 
general principles of EU law, and by the fundamental rights 
enshrined in the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Only for the latter 
convention, it is generally accepted that the human rights 
protected therein lay down minimal standards.28 But, beyond 
the specific function of the Convention, as a matter of principle, 
it would be difficult for citizens to accept that the protection 
offered by fundamental rights with respect to EU institutions or 
acts undertaken by Member States to implement Union law 
would offer a lower level of protection than the one ensured on 
the national level against “purely” national acts of public 
authority. Differences in the level of protection would finally 
lead to a detrimental forum shopping in search of the most 
advantageous human rights protection29 and provoke major 
difficulties in the delimitation of the respective jurisdictional 
competences.30 
But, beyond those general considerations which imply an 
enhanced degree of awareness for comparative law 
considerations in the protection of fundamental rights, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union goes 
even a step further in making such considerations mandatory. It 
is quite striking to see that article 52 of the Charter, specifically 
in paragraphs 3, 4, and 6, contains provisions which are much 
more elaborate and precise than the rather general rule 
contained in article 39 of the South African Constitution. In 
addition, it seems that those provisions form a set of 
complementary requirements which, as such, might cause 
difficulties and even create contradictions. Article 52, paragraph 
                                                                                                             
28. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 53, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“Nothing in this 
Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High 
Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a party.”). 
29. See Kamberaj v. L’Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di 
Bolzano and Others, Case C-571/10, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 62; Åklagaren v. Åkerberg 
Fransson, Case C-617/10, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 44. 
30. See Åkerberg Fransson, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 17–27; 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Apr. 24, 2013, 1 
BvR 1215/07, NJW-RECHTSPRECHUNGS- REPORT, ZIVILRECHT [NJW] 2013, 1499, 1501 
(Ger.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20130424_1bvr121
507.html; Voßkuhle, European Integration, supra note 23. 
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3, states that for the Charter rights, which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention, the meaning and scope of those 
rights shall be the same as those laid down in the Convention. It 
is clarified that this provision does not prevent Union law to 
provide a more extensive protection. In the same line of 
reasoning but less imperative, article 52, paragraph 4, foresees 
that fundamental rights which are recognized by the Charter as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, shall be interpreted in harmony with those 
traditions. Finally, article 52, paragraph 6, holds that full 
account shall be taken to national laws and practices where the 
articles of the Charter contain a specific reference to national 
laws and practices. 
Doubtlessly, those requirements have been included in the 
Charter in order to achieve a well-balanced and generally 
accepted standard of protection in the field of fundamental 
rights which should not differ too significantly from the 
traditions of the Member States. But, since those are far from 
being identical, the application of these interpretation-
guidelines is even more accentuated by the explanations to the 
Charter which have been drafted in order to give guidance in 
the interpretation of the Charter and which shall, according to 
article 52, paragraph 7, be given due regard by the courts of the 
Union and of the Member States. For the time being, it is not 
yet foreseeable how the Court will face those different directives 
of interpretation which might, notably in a situation in which 
fundamental rights apply on the basis of multilateral relations, 
avoid incoherent results and, in particular, an open conflict 
between diverging requirements. It is even less predictable as to 
whether the ECJ will be able to apply those guidelines as a set of 
strict limitations to its judicial autonomy in the interpretation of 
the Charter rights or whether the need for an autonomous 
interpretation of the fundamental rights as it follows from the 
structure and the objectives of the Union will prevail.31 
                                                                                                             
31. See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für 
Getreide und Futtermittel, Case C-11/70, [1970] E.C.R. I-1126, ¶4. 
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II. RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ ON THE RULE OF 
LAW 
It should not be too much of a surprise that the recent 
jurisprudence of the ECJ on the rule of law was not triggered by 
the deviant behavior of Member States which is, as we will see 
later on, undoubtedly, in need of a reinforcement of the rule of 
law. The recent jurisprudence of the Court on the rule of law 
was rather provoked by the institutions of the European Union 
and, more generally, by what has become famous as the “war on 
terror.” It was the mechanism of the so-called smart sanctions 
which the Security Council of the United Nations used inter alia 
against private individuals and associations, which has given rise 
to the question how the right of defense would and could be 
ensured in a situation in which the European Union was 
charged to implement the sanctions binding under the UN 
Charter. Already in 2008, in the landmark decision in the joined 
case Kadi and Al Barakaat,32 the Court recognized the necessity 
                                                                                                             
32. See Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and Commission, Joined 
Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 281. The legal comments 
relating to this judgment are abundant, see, e.g., MARKUS KOTZUR, Kooperativer 
Grundrechtsschutz in der Völkergemeinschaft, in EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT 
673 (2008) (Ger.); PAUL CASSIA & FRANCIS DONNAT, Terrorisme International et Droits 
Fondamentaux: Les Leçons du Droit Communautaire, in REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT 
ADMINISTRATIF 1204 (2008) (Fr.); ROBERT KOLB, Le Contrôle de Résolutions 
Contraignantes du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies Sous ’L’angle du Respect du Jus 
Cogens, in REVUE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET EUROPÉEN 401 (2008) (Fr.); 
JÖRN AXEL KÄMMERER, Das Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofes im Fall “Kadi”“: Ein 
Triumph der Rechtsstaatlichkeit?, in EUROPARECHT 114 (2009) (Ger.); JEAN PAUL JACQUÉ, 
Primauté du Droit International versus Protection des Droits Fondamentaux, in REVUE 
TRIMESTRIEL DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 161 (2009) (Fr.); KIRSTEN SCHMALENBACH, Bedingt 
Kooperationsbereit: Der Kontrollanspruch des EuGH bei Gezielten Sanktionen der Vereinten 
Nationen, in JURSITENZEITUNG 3 (2009) (Ger.); STEFAN GRILLER, Die Bindung der 
Europäischen Union an das Recht der Vereinten Nationen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 
Rechtswirkungen von Beschlüssen des Sicherheitsrates im Unionsrecht, in ZEITSCHRIFT 
EUROPARECHT 103 (2012) (abbreviated language of material); Guy Harpaz, Judicial 
Review by the European Court of Justice of UN ‘Smart Sanctions’ Against Terror in the Kadi 
Dispute, 14 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 65 (2009); Grainne De Búrca, The European Court of 
Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 44 (2010); Ana 
Maria Salinas DeFrias, COUNTER-TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 83 
(Katja Samuel & Nigel White eds., 2012); Christian Tomuschat, The Kadi Case: What 
Relationship is there between the Universal Legal Order under the Auspices of the United Nations 
and the EU Legal Order?, 28 Y.B. OF EURO. L. 654 (2009); Federico Fabbrini, The Role of 
the Judiciary in Times of Emergency: Judicial Review of Counter-Terrorism Measures in the 
United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice, 28 Y.B. OF EURO. L. 664 
(2009). 
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for a full judicial review of such implementation measures of UN 
sanctions on grounds of fundamental rights granted by the legal 
order of the Union. The ECJ emphasized that the European 
Union is based on the rule of law inasmuch as neither the 
Member States nor its institutions can avoid review of the 
conformity of their acts with the treaty understood as “basic 
constitutional charter,” which enables the ECJ to review the 
legality of acts of the institutions, even if those acts are 
undertaken in fulfillment of obligations resulting from 
international agreements.33 
A. Effective Judicial Protection Against Restrictive Measures 
On the basis of that truly fundamental component of the 
rule of law, the Court had to further develop the requirements 
of judicial control under the circumstances of the war against 
terror in the case of ZZ, concerning a decision to refuse entry to 
a Union citizen to the United Kingdom on imperative grounds 
of public security, which were essentially based on “closed 
evidence” and had, in accordance with national law, not been 
disclosed to ZZ.34 Under those circumstances, the reference to 
the Court focused on the requirements of effective judicial 
protection and in particular on whether the essence of the 
grounds must be disclosed to the Union citizen concerned by 
such a decision. At the outset, the ECJ repeated the settled 
caselaw according to which the fundamental right to an effective 
legal remedy would be infringed if a judicial decision were 
founded on facts and documents which the parties themselves, 
or one of them, have not had an opportunity to examine and on 
which they have therefore been unable to state their views.35 
                                                                                                             
33. See Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found., [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 285; Faraj Hassan 
v. Council and Chafiq Ayadi v. Council, Joined Cases C-399/06 & C-403/06 P, [2009] 
E.C.R. I-11393, ¶ 71; Bank Melli Iran v. Council, Case C-548/09 P, [2011] E.C.R. I-
11381, ¶ 105; Commission and Others v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Joined Cases C-584/10 
P, C-593/10 P, & C-595/10 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 66–67. 
34. See ZZ v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Case C-300/11, [2013] E.C.R. 
I____, ¶¶ 24, 28–32, 40–44. 
35. Id. ¶ 53, 56; Josep Peñarroja Fa, Joined Cases C-372/09 & C-373/09, [2011] 
E.C.R. I-1785, ¶ 63; Gaydarov v. Director na Glavna direktsia “Ohranitelna politsia” pri 
Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti, Case C-430/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-11637, ¶ 41. To this 
effect, see Union nationale des entraîneurs et cadres techniques professionnels du 
football (Unectef) v. Heylens and Others, Case C-222/86, [1987] E.C.R. I-4097, ¶ 15; 
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However, the Court noted that it may prove necessary not 
to disclose certain information to the person concerned, in 
particular in the light of overriding considerations connected 
with State security. If, in exceptional cases, reasons of State 
security are invoked to refuse full disclosure of grounds which 
constitute the basis of a decision taken under the directive 
2004/38, the national court must have at its disposal and apply 
techniques and rules of procedural law which accommodate, on 
the one hand, legitimate State security considerations regarding 
the nature and sources of the information taken into account in 
the adoption of such a decision and, on the other hand, the 
need to ensure sufficient compliance with the person’s 
procedural rights, such as the right to be heard and the 
adversarial principle.36 In the context of the judicial review 
under directive 2004/38 the Member States must lay down rules 
enabling the court entrusted with review of the decision’s 
legality to examine both all the grounds and the related 
evidence on the basis of which the decision was taken. The 
national courts with jurisdiction in that matter must carry out an 
independent examination of all matters of law and fact relied 
upon by the competent national authority and it must 
determine whether State security stands in the way of such 
disclosure.37 If it turns out that State security in fact does stand 
in the way of precise and full disclosure, judicial review has to be 
carried out in a procedure which strikes an appropriate balance 
between the requirements flowing from State security and the 
requirements of the right to effective judicial protection whilst 
limiting any interference with the exercise of that right to what 
is strictly necessary.38 
The Court went on and established an essential distinction 
in that field. On the one hand, in order to comply with article 
47 of the Charter, the person concerned must be informed, in 
any event, of the essence of the grounds on which a decision 
                                                                                                             
Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, Joined 
Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, [2008] E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 337; Commission v. Ireland 
and Others, Case C-89/08 P, [2009] E.C.R. I-11245, ¶ 52; and Banif Plus Bank Zrt v. 
Csaba Csipai & Viktória Csipai, Case C-472/11, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 30. 
36. ZZ, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 57; Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found., [2008] E.C.R. 
I-6351, ¶ 344. 
37. ZZ, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 61–62. 
38. Id. ¶ 64. 
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refusing entry is based. On the other hand, the weighing up of 
the right to effective judicial protection against the necessity to 
protect the security of the Member State concerned is not 
applicable in the same way to the evidence underlying the 
grounds produced before the national courts, since disclosure of 
that evidence is liable to compromise State security in a direct 
and specific manner and may, in particular, endanger the life, 
health, or freedom of persons or reveal the methods of 
investigation specifically used by the national security authorities 
and seriously impede, or even prevent, future performance of 
the tasks of those authorities.39 In such circumstances, the 
national court finally has to assess whether the failure to disclose 
the evidence is such as to affect the evidential value of the 
confidential evidence.40 
In the Kadi II judgment, concerning again the 
“blacklisting” of individuals under the circumstances of the war 
against terror, the Court transposed the essential requirements 
developed in ZZ to the freezing of economic resources on the 
basis of the inscription in a list drawn up by the Sanction’s 
Committee of the United Nations.41 On that basis, the Court 
went on to examine the different reasons on which Mr. Kadi had 
been listed and concluded whether those were sufficiently 
detailed and specific to allow for an effective defense.42 Taking 
the comments of Mr. Kadi into account, the Court concluded 
that none of the allegations presented against Mr. Kadi in the 
summary provided by the Sanctions Committee were such as to 
justify the adoption of restrictive measures on the level of the 
European Union against him, either because the statement of 
reasons was insufficient or because information or evidence 
which might have substantiated the reason concerned, was 
lacking.43 It should still be noted that the Court is, indeed, 
pursuing a balanced approach to the scrutiny of restrictive 
measures taken in the context of the fight against terrorism as it 
                                                                                                             
39. Id. ¶ 66.  
40. Id. ¶ 67. 
41. Commission and Others v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-
593/10 P & C-595/10 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 100–101 (referencing ZZ, [2013] E.C.R. 
I-0000, ¶¶ 51, 53); id. ¶¶ 120, 125–29 (referencing ZZ, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 54, 57, 
59, 61–64, 67). 
42. Id. ¶¶ 143–49. 
43. Id. ¶ 163. 
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follows notably from the judgments in Al-Aqsa44 and in Kala 
Naft,45 in which the decisions under scrutiny were upheld.  
B. Effective Judicial Protection and the Failure to Adjudicate Within a 
Reasonable Time 
Without neglecting that the above mentioned 
jurisprudence is certainly due to a number of circumstances 
which are specific to this subject matter, it should still be 
underlined that the right to effective judicial protection is the 
most important right under the Charter invoked in proceedings 
before the Court since the Charter entered into force46 and has 
therefore given rise to quite a number of remarkable 
jurisprudential evolutions. One of the most interesting 
evolutions concerns the enforcement of the right to effective 
judicial protection against the failure to adjudicate within a 
reasonable time. In its earlier jurisprudence, the Court had been 
confronted with the plea and accepted that such a failure 
constituted a procedural irregularity. In the case of 
Baustahlgewebe v. Commission, the ECJ held that such a failure 
could justify a reduction of the amount of a fine imposed by the 
Commission in cartel-proceedings against an economic 
undertaking.47 In a later case concerning a decision of the 
Commission finding that there had been abuse of a dominant 
position, the ECJ held that the failure of the General Court to 
adjudicate within a reasonable time can give rise to a claim for 
damages48. 
                                                                                                             
44. See Stichting Al-Aqsa v. Council, Joined Cases 539/10 P & C-550/10 P, [2012] 
E.C.R. I____. 
45. See Council v. Mfg. Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran, Case 
C-348/12 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____. 
46. As for the cases closed until February 1, 2014, Article 47 of the Charter has 
been invoked, all types of proceedings included, in more than 80 cases before the 
Court, see, e.g., ZZ, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 34, 40–69; Pringle v. Ireland, Case 
C-370/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 28, 178; Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. 
European Parliament and Council, Case C-583/11 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 30, 93–
125; Mfg. Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 65, 66, 
68. 
47. Baustahlgewebe v. Commission, Case C-185/95 P, [1998] E.C.R. I-8417, ¶ 48. 
48. Der Grüne Punkt v. Commission, Case C-385/07 P, [2009] E.C.R. I-6155, ¶ 
195. 
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The Court had to reconsider this jurisprudence in the cases 
Gascogne Sack Deutschland,49 Kendrion NV,50 and Group Gascogne 
SA51 and came to a quite comprehensive approach. Based on the 
settled case law of the Strasburg Court, the ECJ confirmed that a 
failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time must, as a 
procedural irregularity constituting the breach of a fundamental 
right, give rise to an effective remedy.52 It went on explaining 
why the failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time can 
neither justify to set aside the judgment under appeal nor to 
annul the fine imposed by the contested decision.53 On the 
question to reduce the fine imposed by the contested decision, 
the Court did not continue in the line of its jurisprudence in 
Baustahlgewebe v. Commission, but held that a claim for damages 
brought against the European Union pursuant to Articles 268 
and 340, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (“TFEU”) constitutes an effective remedy of 
general application, which has to be brought first to the General 
Court, sitting in a different composition from that which heard 
the dispute giving rise to the claim for damages and only on 
appeal to the ECJ.54 It will be for the General Court to evaluate 
the relevant criteria for assessing whether it had observed the 
reasonable time principle which the Court had exposed in Der 
Grüne Punkt55 as well as the actual existence of the harm alleged 
and the causal connection between the harm and the excessive 
length of the legal proceedings.56 The final consideration of the 
Court on the cases brought before it shows that the ECJ did not 
allow for an easy way out, but demonstrated that it is indeed 
committed to an effective remedy for asserting and penalizing 
the breach of article 47 of the Charter. 
                                                                                                             
49. Gascogne Sack Deutschland v. Commission, Case C-40/12, [2013] E.C.R. 
I____. 
50. Kendrion NV v. Commission, Case C-50/12 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____. 
51. Groupe Gascogne SA v. Commission, Case C-58/12 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____. 
52. See Gascogne Sack, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 80 (citing Kudla v. Poland, 2000-XI 
Eur. Ct. H.R. § 156–157); Kendrion, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 81 (citing Kudla v. Poland, 
2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. § 156–157); Groupe Gascogne, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 72 (citing 
Kudla v. Poland, 2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. § 156–157). 
53. See Kendrion, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 82–88. 
54. See id. ¶¶ 95, 101. 
55. Der Grüne Punkt v Commission, Case C-385/07 P, [2009] E.C.R. I-06155, ¶¶ 
181, 182, 186; Kendrion, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 96–98. 
56. Kendrion, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 99, 101. 
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In sum, this jurisprudence contains different messages. The 
most evident one is the demonstration that the ECJ’s approach 
is, even without formal adherence to the convention, fully 
consistent with the settled case-law of the Strasburg Court. 
Hereby the ECJ is reinforcing its image as independent guardian 
in the field of fundamental rights in which it invariably applies 
its standard of review. A second message, addressed to the 
General Court, indicates that the failure to adjudicate in a 
reasonable period of time is to be taken seriously and will, 
beyond the negative public exposure, lead to a further increase 
in its workload. And a final message is addressed to the Union’s 
political institutions and the Member States to live up to their 
common responsibility for the well-functioning of the judicial 
institutions of the Union.57 
C. Legislative Discretion and Judicial Scrutiny 
While the recent jurisprudence of the ECJ on effective 
judicial protection is recognizably marked by the impetus which 
the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has 
brought about, the recent jurisprudence on the rule of law 
relates as well to questions of general nature and, in particular, 
to an “eternal” question of any system of constitutional justice: 
The interrelation between legislative discretion and judicial 
scrutiny and more precisely the way in which the Court operates 
its control and how it is respecting the discretion which is 
attributed to the legislator in any constitutional democracy. 
According to the settled case-law, the Court acknowledges 
that in the exercise of the powers conferred on the legislator of 
the European Union, it enjoys a broad discretion where its 
action involves political, economic, and social choices and where 
it is called on to undertake complex assessments and 
evaluations. In addition, where it is called on to restructure or 
establish a complex system, it is entitled to have recourse to a 
step-by-step approach.58 As regards to the judicial review of 
                                                                                                             
57. See, in that respect, the proposition of the Court to increase the number of 
judges at the General Court, Council Draft Regulation No. 8787/11 on Amendments to 
the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and to Annex I thereto (Apr. 
7, 2011). 
58. See Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others v Premier ministre, 
Ministre de l’Écologie et du Développement durable and Ministre de l’Économie, des 
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compliance with constitutional requirements, such as the 
principle of proportionality, in the fields in which the European 
Union legislature has a broad legislative power, the lawfulness of 
a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the 
measure is manifestly inappropriate, having regard to the 
objective which the competent institutions are seeking to 
pursue. However, even where it has such a discretion, the 
legislature must base its choice on objective criteria appropriate 
to the aim pursued by the legislation, taking into account all the 
facts and the technical and scientific data available at the time of 
the adoption of the act in question. When exercising its 
discretion, the EU legislature must fully take into account all the 
interests involved. In examining the burdens associated with 
various possible measures, it must be considered that, even if the 
importance of the objectives pursued is such as to justify even 
substantial negative economic consequences for certain 
operators, the exercise of the legislator’s discretion must not 
produce results that are manifestly less appropriate than those 
produced by other suitable measures.59 Where the European 
Union legislature is obliged to assess the future effects of rules 
to be adopted and those effects cannot be accurately foreseen, 
its assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly 
incorrect in the light of the information available to it at the 
time of the adoption of the rules in question.60 However, 
according to the case-law of the Court, the legislature is obliged, 
                                                                                                             
Finances et de l’Industrie, Case C-127/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-9895, ¶ 57; Int’l Air Transp. 
Ass’n v. Dep’t for Transp., Case C-344/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-403, ¶ 80; Rewe-Zentrale v. 
Direktor der Landwirtschaftskammer Rheinland, Case 37/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1229, ¶ 20; 
Assurances du Crédit v. Council & Commission, Case C-63/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-1799, ¶ 
11; Germany v. Parliament & Council, Case C-233/94, [1997] E.C.R. I-2405, ¶ 43. 
59.  Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, [2008] E.C.R I-9895, ¶¶ 58–59; 
Tempelman and van Schaijk v Directeur van de Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en 
Vlees, Joined Cases C-96-97/03, [2005] E.C.R.  I-1895, ¶ 48; Agrarproduktion Staebelow 
v. Landrat des Landkreises Bad Doberan, Case C-504/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-679, ¶ 37; 
The Queen v. Minister of Agric., Fisheries and Food and Sec‘y of State for Health, ex 
parte: Fedesa and others, Case C-331/88, [1990] E.C.R.  I-4023, ¶¶ 15–17; Greece v 
Commission, Case C-86/03, [2005] E.C.R.  I-10979, ¶ 96. 
60. Schaible v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C-101/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____, 
¶ 50; Agrarproduktion Staebelow v. Landrat des Landkreises Bad Doberan, Case C-
504/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-679, ¶ 38; Agrana Zucker Agrana Zucker GmbH v. 
Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft, Case C-
309/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-7333, ¶ 45. 
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under certain circumstances, to consider the need for a review 
of the adopted measures.61 
As it appears from this jurisprudence, the ECJ does not 
issue a blank check to the EU legislature and operates various 
differentiations which allow for a well-balanced approach to this 
matter. In the Vodafone case, the Court placed much emphasis 
on the impact assessment which the Commission had presented 
in relation to the legislative proposal under scrutiny of the 
Court62 in order to verify the rationality of the assessments 
operated in the legislative procedure. In doing so, the ECJ not 
only contributes to the success of the European Union’s 
initiative for a “better legislation,”63 but adopts a properly 
balanced approach between legislative discretion and judicial 
scrutiny. 
D. Balancing Fundamental Rights 
The recent jurisprudence of the ECJ has not only 
demonstrated a reasonable reinforcement of the intensity of its 
scrutiny in general, but indicates in particular that the principle 
of proportionality has received lately an enhanced attention.64 
                                                                                                             
61. See Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and others, [2008] E.C.R. I-9895, ¶ 62; 
Schaible v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C-101/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 92. 
62. Vodafone v. Sec’y of State for Bus., Enter. and Regulatory Reform, Case C-
58/08, [2010] E.C.R. I-4999, ¶¶ 5, 55, 58, 65. 
63. As for the action of the European Commission for improving the quality, 
effectiveness and simplicity of EU legislation, see, for example, Commission of the 
European Communities, European Governance: A White Paper,  COM(2001) 428 final 
(July 2001), 20; Commission of the European Communities, Action Plan “Simplifying 
and Improving the Regulatory Environment”, COM(2002) 278 final (May 2002); 
Communication of 6 June 2002, European Governance: Better Lawmaking, 
COM(2002) 275 final; Commission of the European Communities, Communication of, 
Updating and Simplifying the Community Acquis, COM(2003) 71 final (Feb. 2003). In 
Commission of the European Communities, EU Regulatory Fitness, COM(2012)746 
(Dec. 2012), the European Commission committed to strengthening the existing smart 
regulation tools (impact assessment, evaluation, stakeholder consultation) and 
launched the Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (“REFIT”), aiming at 
identifying regulatory burdens, gaps and inefficient or ineffective measures as well as 
possibilities for simplification or repeal. Since 1992, the European Commission has 
been publishing an annual report on Better Lawmaking, covering also subsidiarity and 
proportionality. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Annual Report 
2012 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, COM(2013) 566 final (July 2013). 
64. See Vodafone, [2010] E.C.R. I-4999; Afton Chem. v Secr’y of State for Transp., 
Case C-343/09, [2010] E.C.R.I-7027; Sky Österreich v Österreichischer Rundfunk, Case 
C-283/11, [2013] E.C.R. I____; Schaible v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case C-101/12, 
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According to settled case-law, the principle of proportionality 
requires that measures adopted by EU institutions do not 
exceed the limits of what is “appropriate and necessary in order 
to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in 
question; when there is a choice between several appropriate 
measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the 
disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims 
pursued.”65 The Court carefully enhanced the intensity of its 
scrutiny in recent judgments with respect to any 
disproportionate nature of an obligation imposed on individuals 
insofar as it has to verify whether the legislature has met its 
obligation to strike a balance between the different interests at 
issue66 and, in particular, whether the requirements arising from 
those different rights and freedoms have been carried out in 
order to reconcile them and to strike a fair balance between 
them.67  
The balancing exercise which the ECJ carefully undertook 
in the Schecke & Eifert case in 2010 concerned the reconciling of 
the objective of transparency protected under article 15 TFEU 
with the rights to privacy and the protection of personal data 
protected under articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and led the 
Court to an annulment of the contested regulation with respect 
to private individuals since it found that the EU institutions had 
not struck the required balance between the interests at stake.68 
On the basis of the same balancing test, the Court arrived at the 
opposite conclusion in Sky Österreich, in which the ECJ noted 
that the EU legislature was required to strike a balance between 
the freedom to conduct a business, on the one hand, and the 
fundamental freedom of citizens of the European Union to 
receive information and the freedom and pluralism of the 
                                                                                                             
[2013] E.C.R. I____; Schecke and Eifert v Land Hessen, Joined Cases C-92-93/09, 
[2010] E.C.R. I-11063; Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Kärntner Landesregierung and 
Others, Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, [2014] E.C.R. I____. 
65. See Afton Chem., [2010] E.C.R. I-07027, ¶ 45; Sky Österreich, [2013] E.C.R. I____, 
¶ 50; Schaible [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 29. 
66. See Schecke and Eifert [2010] E.C.R. I-11063, ¶ 77; Sky Österreich [2013] E.C.R. 
I____, ¶ 59; Schaible [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 94. 
67. See Promusicae v. Telefónica de España SAU, Case C-275/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-
00271, ¶¶ 65–66; Deutsches Weintor eG v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case C-544/10, 
[2012] E.C.R. I-0000, ¶ 47; Sky Österreich, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 60. 
68. See Schecke and Eifert, [2010] E.C.R. I-11063, ¶¶ 72, 77, 79, 80; Schaible, [2013] 
E.C.R. I____, ¶ 60. 
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media, on the other hand.69 In the latter case the Court 
concluded that the legislature was entitled to adopt the 
contested rule on access to exclusive broadcasting rights for the 
purpose of making short news reports which limit the freedom 
to conduct a business and to give priority, in the necessary 
balancing of the rights and interests at issue, to public access to 
information over contractual freedom.70 
In Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others,71 the ECJ 
only very recently declared the Data Retention Directive 
2006/24 to be invalid, holding that the retention of the entire 
electronic telephony and internet traffic data of virtually all 
users in the European Union is a disproportionate measure for 
attaining the objective of public security. The ECJ explicitly 
stated that in view of the important role played by the protection 
of personal data in the light of the fundamental right to respect 
for private life as laid down in articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, 
and regarding the extent and seriousness of the interference 
caused by the data retention directive, the EU legislature’s 
discretion is reduced and judicial review has to be strict.72 The 
Court acknowledged that the fight against crime and terrorism 
is undisputedly of utmost importance and pointed out that 
everybody’s right to security is laid down in article 6 of the 
Charter.  
However, even such a fundamental objective of general 
interest does not, in itself, justify the retention measures such as 
established by the directive. On the contrary, the ECJ regarded 
the retention measures to be disproportionate, since the 
directive does not require any relationship between the data 
whose retention was provided for and a threat to public security. 
In particular, the directive is not restricted to a retention in 
relation (i) to data pertaining to a particular time period and/or 
a particular geographical zone and/or to a circle of particular 
persons likely to be involved in a serious crime, or (ii) to persons 
who could, for other reasons, contribute, by the retention of 
their data, to the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious 
                                                                                                             
69. See Sky Österreich,[2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 59. 
70. See id. ¶¶ 66–67. 
71. See Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, 
Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, [2014] E.C.R. I____. 
72. Id. ¶ 48. 
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offences. Furthermore, the directive does not provide any 
exceptions as to the persons concerned, with the result that it 
applies even to persons whose communications are subject to 
the obligation of professional secrecy.73  
In addition, the directive fails to lay down any objective 
criterion which could ensure that the competent national 
authorities have access to the data and can use them only for the 
purposes of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions 
concerning offences that may be considered to be sufficiently 
serious to justify such interference.74 Also, the retention period 
of a minimum of six months and a maximum of twenty-four 
months does not distinguish between categories of data and 
their potential usefulness for the purpose of public security and 
is not based on objective criteria in order to ensure that it is 
limited to what is strictly necessary.75  
Moreover, the directive also lacks sufficient safeguards, as 
required by article 8 of the Charter, to ensure effective 
protection of the data retained against the risk of abuse and any 
unlawful access. In this context, the Court added that the 
directive did not require the data in question to be retained 
within the European Union, with the result that control of 
compliance with the requirements of protection and security by 
an independent authority, as required by article 8 paragraph 3 
of the Charter, was not fully ensured. Such control, carried out 
on the basis of EU law, is regarded by the ECJ as an essential 
component of the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data.76   
It can be concluded from the recent jurisprudence of the 
ECJ that the scrutiny of the Court tends to be increased in 
situations in which the proper balancing of different 
fundamental rights and freedoms or imperative grounds of 
public policy are at issue. 
                                                                                                             
73. Id. ¶¶ 57–59. 
74. Id. ¶¶ 60–62. 
75. Id. ¶¶ 63–64.  
76. Id. ¶¶ 66–68. 
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E. Distribution of Powers Between the Institutions of the Union 
Another important element of the rule of law, directly 
relating to the political checks and balances embodied in a 
constitutional system, concerns the distinction between the 
adoption of rules in matters which only can be enacted in the 
legislative process and matters which may be subject to rule-
making on the basis of implementing powers. In that respect, 
the adoption of rules essential to a subject matter is, according 
to settled case law, reserved to the legislature of the European 
Union. Therefore, the essential rules governing the matter in 
question must be laid down in the basic legislation and may not 
be delegated.77 In a recent judgment on the Schengen Borders 
Code and in particular the surveillance of the sea external 
borders, the Court held that provisions which, in order to be 
adopted, require political choices falling within the 
responsibilities of the European Union legislature cannot be 
delegated and, furthermore, essential elements of a basic 
legislation cannot be amended nor supplemented by new 
essential elements enacted on the basis of implementing 
powers.78 In that respect, the Court rejected the position taken 
by both the Council and the Commission and pointed out that 
ascertaining which elements of a matter must be categorized as 
essential, is not for the assessment of the European Union 
legislature alone, but must be based on objective factors subject 
to judicial review.79 
After having examined the contested decision in the light 
of the empowering-disposition contained in the basic legislation 
to take implementing measures, the Court judged that the 
adoption of rules on the conferral of enforcement powers on 
border guards entails, on one hand, political choices falling 
                                                                                                             
77. See Parliament v. Council, Case C-355/10, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 64 
(referencing Deutsche Post and Germany v. Commission, Joined Cases C-463/10 P & C-
475/10 P, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 36; Atlanta v. European Cmty., Case C-104/97 P, 
[1999] E.C.R. I-6983, ¶ 76; Molkereigenossenschaft Wiedergeltingen eG v. 
Hauptzollamt Lindau, Case C-356/97, [2000] E.C.R. I-5461, ¶ 21; Parliament v. 
Commission, Case C-156/93, [1995] E.C.R.I-2019, ¶ 18; Parliament v. Council, Case C-
303/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-2943, ¶ 23; Söhl & Söhlke v. Hauptzollamt Bremen, Case C-
48/98, [1999] E.C.R. I-7877, ¶ 34; Parliament v. Council, Case C-133/06, [2008] 
E.C.R.I-3189, ¶ 45. 
78. See Parliament [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 65–66. 
79. See id ¶ 67. 
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within the responsibilities of the European Union legislature in 
so far as it requires the conflicting interests at issue to be 
weighed up on the basis of a number of assessments. Depending 
on political choices, the powers of border guards may vary 
significantly and the adoption of such rules therefore constitutes 
a major development in the system of the Schengen Border 
Code.80 On the other hand, the Court considered important to 
point out that provisions on conferring powers of public 
authority on border guards meant that the fundamental rights 
of the persons concerned may be interfered with to such an 
extent that the involvement of the legislature is required.81 
This judgment constitutes not only a major step to the 
evolution of a more elaborate system on the delegation of 
powers which is specifically addressed in articles 290 and 291 
TFEU and currently under examination before the Court.82 It 
may very well give a first indication as to how the Court might 
interpret the first condition contained in article 52, paragraph 1, 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights requiring that any 
limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized 
by the Charter “must be provided for by law.” In any event, the 
Court has continued to enhance the responsibilities of the 
European Parliament, even to the detriment of Council and 
Commission. But it has not left out to underline that the crucial 
question which elements of a subject-matter must be considered 
as essential remains subject to its judicial review. 
III. ENSURING THE RESPECT OF THE RULE OF LAW BY 
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The foregoing observations on the recent jurisprudence of 
the ECJ relating to the rule of law quite clearly indicate that 
ensuring the rule of law offers more than enough challenges to 
the Court—even without considering the field of application 
which first comes to mind when the rule of law is mentioned in 
the context of European Union law and the process of 
European legal integration: the observance of the rule of law by 
the Member States of the European Union. Taken as such, this 
                                                                                                             
80. See id. ¶ 76. 
81. See id. ¶ 77. 
82. See Commission v Parliament and Council, Case C-427/12 (pending). 
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subject covers the entire question of compliance of Member 
States with EU law and, in particular, the requirements resulting 
from the obligation to ensure a complete transposition of EU 
directives. In that respect, the recent Commission’s 30th Annual 
Report on Monitoring the Application of EU law (2012) of 
October 22, 2013, gives an overview over the observance of EU 
law in general and by each Member State.83 
A. Actual Context 
In recent years, the observance of the rule of law by 
Member States of the European Union has primarily been 
discussed in the context of the public perception that the 
political evolution in a Member State might be in contradiction 
with the values of the Union enshrined in article 2 TEU.84 In the 
actual discussion, reference has in particular been made to 
Hungary,85 and recently to Romania,86 but studies have shown 
                                                                                                             
83. The Commission reports annually on the national implementation of EU law. 
See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, 30th Annual Report on 
Monitoring the Application of EU Law 2012, COM(2013) 726 final (Oct. 2013) 
(including as Parts I and II, specific reports on the Situation per Member State, 
Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2013) 432 final, and the Situation per 
Policies, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2013) 433 final); Commission of 
the European Communities, 29th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU 
Law 2011, COM(2012) 714 final (Oct. 2013) (including specific reports on the 
Situation per Member State and the Situation per policies, Commission Staff Working 
Documents, SEC(2012) 399 final and SEC(2012) 400). 
84. The so-called “Haider Affair” “was giving rise to that discussion.” See, e.g., Per 
Cramér & Pål Wrange, The Haider Affair, Law and European Integration, Europarattslig 
Tidskrift 2000, 28 et seq.; Gregory Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 
HARVARD INT’L L. J. 1 (1995); WALDEMAR HUMMER & ANTON PELINKA, ÖSTERREICH 
UNTER “EU-QUARANTÄNE,”  (2002); Cécile Leconte, The Fragility of the EU as a 
“Community of values”: Lessons from the Haider Affair. 28 W. EURO. POL. 620 et seq. 
(2005); Lucia Serena Rossi, La “Reazione Commune” degli Stati Membri dell’Unione europea 
nel caso Haider, 83 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 151 (2000); HELMUT SCHMITT 
VON SYDOW, Liberté, démocracie, droits fondamentaux et Ètat de droit: analyse de l’article 7 du 
traité UE, in REVUE DU DROIT DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE 285 (2001). 
85. See Caroline Hemler, Europäische Kommission v. Ungarn, V.S.R. EUROPA BLOG 
(Oct. 1, 2012), www.vsr-europa.blogspot.com/2012/01/europaische-kommission-vs-
ungarn.html; Manuel Müller, Demokratie in Ungarn: Zeit für eine neue Grundrechtedoktrin 
des Europäischen Gerichtshofs?, DER (EUROPÄISCHE) FÖDERALIST (Feb. 22, 2012), 
www.foederalist.blogspot.com; Cornelia Ernst, Verfahren nach Artikel 7 E.U.V. gegen 
Ungarn einleiten, Die Linke (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.dielinke-europa.eu/article/
7973.verfahren-nach-artikel-7-euv-gegen-ungarn-einleiten.html; see also Press Release, 
European Parliament, Hungary Must Abide by EU Values, Say MEPs (July 3, 2013), 
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that the situation relating to certain fundamental freedoms 
appears troublesome even in well-established Member States.87 
Beyond all difficulties to find common ground for an adequate 
evaluation of the respective situations and for the acceptance of 
the acting institutions, such as the Venice Commission,88 the 
context of the legal discussion is framed by the inadequacy of 
the procedure foreseen in article 7 TEU which clearly cannot be 
considered as an operational or even suitable instrument to 
ensure the rule of law in the Member States of the European 
Union and the observance of the values enshrined in article 2 
TEU.89 Therefore, it seems to be quite generally accepted in 
                                                                                                             
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130701IPR14768/
html/Hungary-must-abide-by-EU-values-say-MEPs. 
86. See Manuel Müller, Was tun für den Rechtsstaat in Rumänien?, DER 
(EUROPÄISCHE) FÖDERALIST (July 17, 2012), www.foederalist.blogspot.com; Edward 
Kanterian & Cristina Arion, Wie die rumänische Regierung die Verfassung Verbessern will, 
(June 14, 2013), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/wie-die-rumanische-regierung-die-
verfassung-verbessern-will/#.U2epLIFdV8E; Recht im Kontext & Edward Kanterian, The 
Crisis of Democracy in Hungary and Romania—Learning from Weimar?, (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/the-crisis-of-democracy-in-hungary-and-romania-
learning-from-weimar/#.U2epoYFdV8E. 
87. Timm Beichelt, Von Steinen und Glashäusern, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 
ZEITUNG, Dec. 12, 2013, at 7. 
88. The Venice-Commission has delivered in total 12 opinions with regard to 
Hungary, of which 8 opinions were delivered only in 2012: Opinion 683/2012 on the 
Cardinal Acts on the Judiciary that were amended following the adoption of CDL-
AD(2012)001 sur la Hongrie; Opinion 672/2012 on Act CXII of 2011 on informational 
Self-determination and Freedom of Information; Opinion 671/2012 on the Act on the 
Rights of Nationalities; Opinion 668/2012 on Act CLXIII of 2011 on the Prosecution 
Service and Act CLXIV of 2011 on the Status of the Prosecutor General, Prosecutors 
and other Prosecution Employees and the Prosecution Career; Opinion 665/2012 on 
Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court; Opinion 664/2012 on Act CCVI of 2011 
on the Right to Freedom of Conscience and Religion and the Legal Status of Churches, 
Denominations and Religious Communities; Opinion 663/2012 on Act CLXII of 2011 
on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges and Act CLXI of 2011 on the 
Organisation and Administration of Courts; Joint Opinion 662/2012 on the Act on the 
Elections of Members of Parliament of Hungary. As for Romania, the Venice-
Commission has delivered in total 9 opinions, one opinion in 2012: Opinion 685/2012 
on the Compatibility with Constitutional Principles and the Rule of Law of Actions 
Taken by the Government and the Parliament of Romania in Respect of Other State 
Institutions and on the Government Emergency Ordinance on Amendment to the Law 
N° 47. The opinions of the Venice-Commission are available at http://
www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/documents/by_opinion.aspx (02.02.2014). 
89. See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy et al., Reverse Solange—Protecting the Essence of 
Fundamental Rights against EU Member States, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 489, 491, 496–
507 (2012); SERGIO CARRERA ET AL., THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THE EU. TOWARDS AN EU 
COPENHAGEN MECHANISM 6 (2013), available at http://www.ceps.eu/book/rule-law-or-
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academic literature that the procedure in article 7 TEU should 
be modified and “sharpened” in order to make it operational. 
But since such a modification would require a revision of 
the treaty, the discussion has focused on other instruments 
which could practically be made available in due course.90 A new 
conception of the field of application of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, fundamentally 
different from the one embodied in article 51 of this Charter, 
has forcefully been argued for.91 In order to make such a 
concept workable in practice, a right of the ECJ to certiorari has 
been suggested.92 Without going into a profound analysis of the 
different aspects which certainly will have to be taken into 
consideration when reflecting upon such a proposition, I wish to 
limit my remarks to some quite obvious comments. In the first 
place, it has to be borne in mind that the European landscape is 
far from being homogenous when it comes to the respect for the 
rule of law and for fundamental rights by individual Member 
States. In such a situation, an extensive reading of article 51 of 
the Charter—although possibly welcomed by some Member 
States as a European support for the respect of the rule of law 
and in particular of fundamental rights—would not only run 
counter to the article’s wording and meaning as it results from 
the genesis and the general structure of article 51 and 52 of the 
Charter,93 but it would also undoubtedly be considered as an 
                                                                                                             
rule-thumb-new-copenhagen-mechanism-eu; Steven Greer & Andrew Williams, Human 
Rights and the Council of Europe and the EU. Towards ‘individual’, ‘constitutional’ or 
‘institutional’ justice?, 15 EUR. L.J. 462, 474 (2009). For a critique of Art. 7 TEU following 
the example of the Iraq War, see Andrew Williams, The indifferent Gesture: Article 7 TEU, 
the Fundamental Rights Agency and the UK’s Invasion of Iraq, 31 EUR. L.R. 1 (2006). 
90. See von Bogdandy et al., supra note 89, at 508 et seq. 
91. For the “reversed Solange” approach, see id. See also András Jakab, Supremacy 
of the Eu Charter in National Courts in purely domestic Cases, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Mar. 27, 
2013), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/ungarn-was-tun-andras-jakab/#.UvFtA6wt
3bw. 
92. See generally Tom Kennedy, First Steps towards a European Certiorari, 18 EUR. L.R. 
121 (1993); Petra Jeney, Victim of Its Own Success – the EU Court in Need of Reform, OPEN 
SOC’Y FOUNDS. (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.academia.edu/1078276/Victim_of_Its_
Own_Success_the_EU_Court_in_Need_of_Reform. 
93. See Thomas von Danwitz & Katherina Paraschas, A Fresh Start for the Charter: 
Fundamental Questions on the Application of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, 35 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1396, 1399 (2012); ALLAN ROSAS, WHEN IS THE EU CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS APPLICABLE AT NATIONAL LEVEL? 1269 (2012); Koen Lenaerts, 
Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 8 EUR. CONST. L.R. 375 
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unjustified “intervention” in those Member States, in which it is 
considered as a “sovereign” prerogative of the national 
constitutional court to ensure the observance of the rule of law 
and the fundamental rights enshrined in the national 
constitution. Therefore, such an approach would inevitably lead 
to an enhanced institutional controversy between the ECJ and 
national constitutional courts and, not to forget, the Strasburg 
Court. Despite a number of “invitations” addressed to the Court 
in that respect from national courts, the ECJ has so far refrained 
from an extensive reading of article 51, as is demonstrated by 
quite an impressive number of court orders declining its 
jurisdiction.94  
                                                                                                             
(2012); THORSTEN KINGREEN, Ne bis in idem: Zum Gerichtswettbewerb um die 
Deutungshoheit über die Grundrechte, in EUROPARECHT 446 (2013). 
94. See Savia and Others v Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca 
and Others, Case C-287/08, [2008] E.C.R. I-136; Pignataro v Ufficio centrale 
circoscrizionale presso il Tribunale di Catania and Others, Case C-535/08  [2009] 
E.C.R. I-50; Noël v SCP Brouard Daude and Centre de Gestion et d’Étude AGS IDF 
EST, Case C-333/09, [2009] E.C.R. I-205; Hermes Hitel v Nemzeti Földalapkezelő 
Szervezet, Case C-16/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____; Cicala v Regione Siciliana, Case C-
482/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-14139; Attila Vajnai, Case C-328/04, [2005] E.C.R. I-8577; 
Polier v. Najar, Case C-361/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-6; Kurt v Bürgermeister der Stadt Wels, 
Case C-104/08, [2008] E.C.R. I-97; Asparuhov Estov and Others v. Ministerski savet na 
Republika Bulgaria, Case C-339/10, [2010] E.C.R. I-11465; Chartry v. Belgium, Case C-
457/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-819; Rossius and Collard v. Belgium, Joined Cases 267/10 & 
268/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-81; Vino v. Poste Italiane, Case C-161/11, [2011] E.C.R. I-91; 
Pagnoul v. État Belge, Case C-314/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-00136; Lebrun and Howet v. État 
belge, Case C-538/10, [2011] E.C.R. I-00137; Cozman v. Teatrul Municipal Târgovişte, 
Rs. C-462/11, [2011] E.C.R. I-00197; Boncea and Others v. Statul roman, Joined Cases 
C-483-84/1, [2011] E.C.R. I-00198; Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor v. Ministerul 
Administraţiei şi Internelor (MAI) and Others, Case C-434/11, [2011] E.C.R. I- 00196; 
Vinkov v. Nachalnik Administrativno-nakazatelna deynost, Case C-27/11, [2012] E.C.R. 
I____; Currà and Others v. Germany, Case C-466/11, [2012] E.C.R. I____; Ministerul 
Administraţiei şi Internelor (MAI) and Others v. Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor, Case C-
134/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____; Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor v. Ministerul Administraţiei 
şi Internelor, Inspectoratul General al Poliţiei Române, Inspectoratul de Poliţie al 
Judeţului Brașov, Case C-369/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____; Antonella Pedone v. N, Case C-
498/12, [2013] E.C.R. p. I____; Gentile v Ufficio Finanziario della Direzione Ufficio 
Territoriale di Tivoli and Ohters, Case C-499/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____; Ajdini v État 
belge, Case C-312/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____; Rivas Montes v. Instituto Municipal de 
Deportes de Córdoba (Imdeco), Case C-178/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____; Sindicato dos 
Bancários do Norte and Others v. BPN Norte, Case C-128/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____; 
Dutka v. Mezőgazdasági és Vidékfejlesztési Hivatal and Csilla Sajtos v. Budapest Főváros 
VI. Ker. Önkormányzata, Joined Cases C-614/12 & C-10/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____; Weigl 
v. Nemzeti Innovációs Hivatal, Case C-332/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____; Sociedade Agrícola 
e Imobiliária da Quinta de S. Paio Lda v Instituto da Segurança Social IP, Case C-
258/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____; Schuster & Co Ecologic SRL v. Direcţia Generală a 
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This prudent policy of institutional self-restraint is not only 
motivated by a well-balanced concept of a mutual respect for the 
jurisdiction both of national constitutional courts and the basic 
objective of the Strasburg system and the preservation of its 
integrity, but also reflects in particular a realistic self-
understanding of the role attributed to the Court by the treaties 
of the European Union. Notably, it reflects a keen sense for the 
legitimacy of the Court and its limits which even after sixty years 
of European integration may still not be compared to the 
legitimacy of national supreme or constitutional courts.95 In any 
event, an extensive interpretation of article 51 of the Charter 
would inevitably lead to a fundamental shift in the multilayered 
system of judicial protection between Member States, the 
European Union, and the ECJ and the conventional system of 
the Strasburg court, which might be perceived as largely 
duplicating the Strasburg system and in the end bear the risk of 
jeopardizing its very existence, at least for the Member States of 
the EU. Insofar as the problem to cure results from a deficient 
observance of the rule of law and fundamental rights beyond the 
field of application of EU law, given the historic mission of the 
Strasburg system it would seem logical to enhance its proper 
effectiveness. As understandable as it might be to foster the 
respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights by an 
application of the instruments resulting from EU law,96 it should 
                                                                                                             
Finanţelor Publice a Judeţului Sibiu– Activitatea de Inspecţie Fiscală, Case C-371/13, 
[2014] E.C.R. I____; Sergio Alfonso Lorrai, Case C-224/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____; 
Sándor Nagy v. Hajdú-Bihar Megyei Kormányhivatal and Others, Joined Cases C-488–
491/12 & C-526/12, [2014] E.C.R. I____; Cholakova v. Osmo rayonno upravlenie pri 
Stolichna direktsia na vatreshnite raboti, Case C-14/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____; Tribunale 
di Tivoli, Case C-73/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____ (not yet reported); Francesco Fierro and 
Fabiana Marmorale v. Edoardo Ronchi and Cosimo Scocozza, Case C-106/13, [2014] 
E.C.R. I____; Claudio Loreti and Others v. Comune di Zagarolo, Case C-555/12, [2014] 
E.C.R. I____; Cruciano Siragusa v. Regione Sicilia—Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e 
Ambientali di Palermo, Case C-206/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____. 
95. Thomas von Danwitz, Verfassungsrechtliche Herausforderungen in der jüngeren 
Rechtsprechung des EuGH, EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT 253, 253 (2013). 
96. For an approach which the Court has firmly rejected so far, see Kamberaj, 
Case C-571/10, [2012] E.C.R. I____; Åkerberg Fransson, Case C-617/10, [2013] E.C.R. 
I____. See also Clemens Ladenburger, European Union Institutional Report, in Laffranque 
(Hrsg.), Reports of the XXV FIDE Congress, 2012, Vol. 1, S. 141 et seq., 183 et seq.; 
Clemens Ladenburger, in Tettinger/Stern (Hrsg.), Europäische Grundrechte-Charta, 
Art. 52, ¶¶ 80 et seq., in particular ¶¶ 85 et seq. (2006); von Danwitz & Paraschas, supra 
note 93, at 1396, 1410; Martin Borowsky, Art. 51, in CHARTA DER GRUNDRECHTE DER 
EUROPÄISCHEN UNION ¶ 33 et seq. (Jürgen Meyer ed., 3d ed. 2011); Koen Lenaerts, 
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in the end not be forgotten that this cure only can be made 
available for EU Member States. Therefore such an approach 
would, in the long run, leave “what’s left” to the Strasburg 
system and make it increasingly difficult to maintain the 
effectiveness and authority of this system which is much more in 
need for it than judicial protection in Europe elsewhere. 
B. The Role of the ECJ in Ensuring the Respect of Rule of Law by EU 
Member States 
In recent years as much as in the past, the Court has been 
confronted with alleged infringements of EU law by all Member 
States, although the number of infringement proceedings 
brought before the Court is currently declining.97 The public 
debate on the political and constitutional evolution of some 
Member States and in particular of Hungary should not lead to 
the erroneous conclusion that it is only these Member States 
which are at the origin of proceedings relating to an alleged 
inobservance of the rule of law. It should rather be born in mind 
that even for well-established Member States the record on the 
observance of the rule of law is not beyond doubt.98 But, of 
course, the Court has recently been confronted with cases 
relating to the political and constitutional evolution in Hungary 
and has made its contribution to ensure the respect of the rule 
of law in this country. 
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1. Impressions of an Ongoing Integration Process 
In the first place the Court was confronted with an 
application by Hungary to find, in essence, that the Slovak 
Republic had failed to fulfill its obligations under EU law in not 
allowing Hungarian President Sólyom to access Slovak territory 
on August 21, 2009,99 for taking part in a ceremony to 
inaugurate a statue of Saint Stephen, the founder and first king 
of the Hungarian State. August 21st is considered to be a 
sensitive date in Slovakia, since it was on August 21, 1968, that 
the armed forces of five Warsaw pact countries, which included 
Hungarian troops, invaded the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 
With respect to the obligation resulting from the citizenship of 
the Union, the Court held that the right for all Union citizens to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
is subject to limitations resulting from international law 
applicable to the status of Mr. Sólyom as Hungarian head of 
State.100 Since the presence of a Head of State on the territory of 
another State imposes an obligation to protection on the latter, 
the status of Head of State therefore has a specific character 
governed by international law, which is in fact able to justify a 
limitation on the exercise of the right of free movement 
conferred by article 21 TFEU and directive 2004/38.101 The 
Court found as well that the refusal of the Slovak Republic to 
allow the President of Hungary access to its territory did not 
come under the concept of the abuse of rights as defined in the 
case-law of the Court.102 If this case does not reveal important 
legal insight, the political incident on which it is based shows to 
the contrary quite impressively that the importance of good 
neighborly relations and mutual understanding of the delicate 
nature of historical events does not constitute an acquis to the 
same degree common to all Member States of the European 
Union. 
A comparable sentiment is raised by a request for a 
preliminary ruling referred to the Court from a Hungarian 
Court of first Instance concerning, in substance, the question as 
                                                                                                             
99. Hungary v. Slovak Republic, Case C-364/10, [2012] E.C.R. I____. 
100. See id. ¶¶ 43–44. 
101. See id. ¶¶ 48, 52. 
102. See id. ¶¶ 53, 58–60. 
2014] THE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ 1343 
to whether the conditions under which a special tax has been 
levied between 2010 and 2012 was constitutive of a disguised 
discrimination of foreign-owned undertakings. The Court held 
that the application of the steeply progressive scale to a 
consolidated tax base consisting of turnover provided for by the 
Hungarian legislation would entail indirect discrimination on 
the basis of the registered office of the companies, if it was liable 
to disadvantage undertakings linked within a group to 
companies established in another Member State on the 
Hungarian market.103 
2. The Recent Constitutional Evolution in Hungary under 
Review by the ECJ 
The recent constitutional evolution of Hungary has been 
subject of two infringement procedures brought by the 
European Commission.104 The first one, which concerned a 
national scheme requiring compulsory retirement of judges, 
prosecutors, and notaries on reaching the age of sixty-two and 
spread the flavor of a court-packing plan,105 was decided on the 
basis of directive 2000/78 on combating discrimination, inter 
alia, on grounds of age. In that respect, the Court categorized 
the provisions at issue as instituting a difference of treatment 
based directly on age106 and pursued its review on the question 
whether this difference in treatment based on age was 
objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim and 
whether the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary.107 In its subsequent review of this standard, the Court 
generously accepted that both the aim of standardization of 
employment relation in the public sector and the aim of 
                                                                                                             
103. See Hervis Sport- és Divatkereskedelmi, Case C-385/12, [2014] E.C.R. I-__, 
¶ 45. 
104. See Commission v. Hungary, Case C-286/12, [2012] E.C.R. I____; 
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106. Commission v. Hungary, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 54. 
107. Id. ¶ 56. 
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attaining a balanced age structure can indeed constitute a 
legitimate aim of employment and labor market policy108 and 
even acknowledged that the national provisions at issue were an 
appropriate means of achieving the aim of standardization 
pursued by Hungary.109 But concerning the objective of 
establishing a balanced age structure, the Court held that the 
measures taken were not appropriate to achieve a truly balanced 
age structure in the medium and long terms.110 On the decisive 
question of the proportionality of the age discrimination, the 
Court held that Hungary failed to provide any evidence to 
establish that more lenient provisions would not have made it 
possible to achieve the objective at issue111 and concluded that 
the provisions at issue were not necessary to achieve the 
objective of standardization invoked by Hungary.112 
If the rather technical answer given by the ECJ might have 
caused some surprise to academic observers who were focusing 
on the constitutional and political nature of the measure at 
issue, the sober reasoning of the Court, strictly limited to the 
technicality of the matter, should be understood as bridging the 
gap which Hungary will have to overcome in accepting the 
judgment. 
The second infringement procedure brought by the 
European Commission against Hungary concerns national 
provisions by which the six-year term of the data protection 
supervisor has been terminated before the end of the term in 
conjunction with the creation of a new national authority on 
data protection and freedom of information.113 It was brought to 
the ECJ on the basis of directive 95/46, which provides for the 
creation of an independent authority charged with the 
supervision of the national law which Member States have 
enacted pursuant to this directive. In essence, it concerns the 
question of whether the requirement of independence, which 
the Court has highlighted in its settled case-law on that 
                                                                                                             
108. Id. ¶¶ 57–62. 
109. Id. ¶ 64. 
110. Id. ¶ 77. 
111. Id. ¶ 71. 
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113. Commission v. Hungary, Case C-288/12 (pending). 
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directive,114 is infringed by a national measure bringing the term 
of the data protection supervisor to an end prior to the one 
foreseen in the mandate. Advocate General Wathelet held on 
the basis of the settled case law115 that already the mere risk of 
any kind of influence on the decisions of the national authority 
on data protection and freedom of information is sufficient for 
an infringement of article 28, paragraph 1, second 
subparagraph, of the directive.116 On the basis of this standard, 
he concluded that the measure in question is in fact contrary to 
the obligations resulting from the directive. In its judgment, the 
ECJ pointed out that the requirement to set up independent 
supervisory authorities on data protection derives from article 8 
paragraph 3 of the Charter and article 16 paragraph 2 TFEU 
and is thus an essential component of the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.117 The 
Court held that the independence requirement covers the 
obligation to allow supervisory authorities to serve their full term 
of office and to have them vacate office before expiry of the full 
term only in accordance with the rules and safeguards 
established by the applicable legislation.118 Hungary failed to 
fulfil its obligations under directive 95/46 by compelling the 
supervisor to vacate office in contravention of the safeguards 
established by statute, thereby compromising his independence.  
IV. ENSURING THE RULE OF LAW—A NEVER ENDING STORY 
The recent jurisprudence of the Court relating to the rule 
of law allows for a couple of conclusions which are, of course, 
drawn from a judge’s perspective. It should not be surprising 
that the challenges which the ECJ has to meet in ensuring the 
rule of law in the European Union are, in essence, not much 
different from what national judges had and still have to cope 
with. 
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In the first place, this overview has shown in particular that, 
even in democratic societies in which the rule of law is 
traditionally respected in principle, it is not self-evident that the 
rule of law will in fact be observed when legislation has to meet 
new challenges. In that respect it should be stressed that the 
democratic nature and all public transparency of the political 
process are not sufficient to ensure the rule of law. For the 
protection of minorities and, in particular, of individuals, a 
reasonably intense judicial review both of individual decisions 
and legislative acts appears indispensable to effectively ensure 
the rule of law. Even in democratic societies it sometimes needs 
courage to resist to political and publicly dominating 
appreciations when the rule of law is endangered. It is therefore 
of crucial importance to monitor the full independence of 
judges on all levels. Secondly, the importance of comparative 
considerations has increased over recent years and will become 
more and more an indispensable condition for legal reasoning 
in the multilayered system of judicial protection in Europe. 
Today, the authority of our judgments requires that they appear 
convincing to judges in all European Member States who are 
primarily rooted in a particular national legal tradition and not 
familiar with the case-law of the Court. It is therefore a 
prerequisite for any further legal integration in Europe that the 
Court communicates on the basis of a legal reasoning which is, if 
not familiar, at least easily understandable to all its judicial 
counterparts. Finally, the rule of law is not a static concept. It 
grows and changes its profile with the evolution of society due to 
economic, social, technological, and political factors. If we need 
the respect for strong traditions in ensuring the rule of law, we 
need as well the openness of our minds to properly react to all 
new evolutions which endanger the rule of law and, thereby, to 
fully live up to the heritage of our founding fathers119: In order 
to finally replace the past striving for a domination of Europe by 
a rule of law in the European Union common to all its citizens, 
it is essential to understand the rule of law as a living 
instrument120 which is shaped according to the challenges 
ahead. 
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